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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH

FOREIGN STUDY LEAGUE
'
Plaintiff and Appellant,
vs.

Case No.
12445

HOLLAND-AMERICA LINE,
Defendant and Respondent.

\

REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT

PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
In this action for a declaratory judgment that no
contract exists between the parties for the charter by
plaintiff of the defendant's passenger steamship, the SS
Rynclam, the plaintiff-appellant, Foreign Study League,
nTersal of the lower court's judgment quashing
service of process for lack of jurisdiction over the person
of the defendant. The League contends that in light of
the un<lisputed evidence the courts of this state have
1

jurisdiction over the defendant-appellee, Hollad America Line, both under the "transaction of business provision of Utah's long arm statute, Utah Code Ann. § 7827-24 ( 1) (Supp. 1969) and under the traditional minimum contacts theory. Holland America Line contends
that its contacts with this state are insufficient to warrant
the assertion of jurisdiction by our courts.
Holland America Line asserts that its contacts with
this state are de minimus and "largely theoretical-if not
imaginary," (HAL Brief at 6) and seeks by persistent
misrepresentation of the evidence to convince this court
of three erroneous factual propositions:
1. That HAL neither solicits nor transacts business

in this state;
2. That the undisputed course of contact between

the parties through their top management personnel was
primarily social in character;
3. That the two negotiating sessions conducted in

Salt Lake City, Utah by Holland America Line's chief
sales managers regarding the use of the Ryndam for
1970 were isolated business contacts relating to a different claim than that sued upon in this case.
Contrary to these contentions of the appellee, however, the evidence below disclosed that Holland America
Line has for many years engaged in a regular, systematic
and continuous course of business dealings in this state,
both with the Foreign Study League, its principal
charter customer, and in general marketing activities.
2

I.
IIOLL,_c\_ND .Al\IERlCA LINE HAS SUFFICIT J\IINilHUM CONTACTS WITH THIS
STATE CONSTITUTIONALLY TO PERMIT
TUE
OF JURISDICTION BY
UL'R COURTS.
Dtspite the appellee's efforts to mask the economic
realities of its contacts with this state, the evidence disclosed that Holland America Line has derived over one
an<l one-half million dollars ($1,500,000.00) in revenues
from this state from the years 1967 through October,
Hl70. (Tr. 31, 33; Deft's Answers and Supp. Answers
tu Interrogatories.) The appellee urges that its revermes from Utah constitute only a minor portion of its
lotal revenues, commenting that in 1969, for example it
JeriYe<l only $27,154 in revenues from Utah. (HAL
urief at 7.) This figure, however, does not include appellee's additional $20,082.25 in freight revenues from
lTtah during that year. Similarly, the appellee neglected
to melltion that its total passenger and freight revenues
from lTtah for the years 1967 through October, 1970,
were
and that its charter revenues from
contracts with the Foreign Study League during that
period amounted to another $1,200,000.00.
In like fashion, the appellee has attempted to mini1nize its profitable and long standing business relation.,hip with the Foreign Study League by characterizing
mn-;i: of the parties contacts in Utah as incident to a social
relationship between Mr. 'fuinman of Holland America
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Line and Mr. Touw of the League, who both testified
below that they are close personal friends. (HAL Brief
at 14-15.) This assertion, however, cannot withstand
analysis. First, the lower court gave no credence whatsoever to this attempt by appellee. Nowhere does the
opinion below even remotely suggest that the friendly
relationship between Mr. Tuinman and Mr. Touw had
any bearing whatever upon the nature and quality of
defendant's contacts with this state. Second, the appellee
again failed to mention the $1,200,000.00 worth of
charter business it obtained from the League during the
sumers of 1968 and 1969, and the appellee likewise failed
to note its contention in another suit that Holland America Line's negotiations with the Foreign Study League
during 1969 and 1970 even produced another $876,000
worth of charter business. (Exhibit A to complaint, p. 2.)
These substantial business transactions over a three-year
period can hardly be dismissed as casual social contacts
between
Tuinman and Mr. Touw.
The appellee concedes in its brief, moreover, that
the two negotiating sessions conducted by its top level
management personnel in this state related to specific
business matters. (IIAL brief at 17.) The appellee attempts to brush these meetings, characterized by Mr.
Touw as the most important negotiations between the
parties, aside by contending that these meetings related
to a different use of the Ryndam than the parties subsequently discussed. (HAL brief at 21-23.) This argument is without merit for two reasons. First, there is no
dispute between the parties that the March, 1969 meet4

ing in Utah related to the use of the Ryndam for 1970.
\Vhile the defendant contended that the March meeting
was devoted primarily to exploring the possibility of
using the R yndam for a West African cruise and the
plaintiff contended that these negotiations were devoted
principally to discussions of using the Ryndam for nine
transatlantic crossings, even Mr. Tuinman admitted that
transatlantic crossings were discussed at the March
meetings, (Tr. 133-34) and Exhibit 3 unquestionably
reflects partial deployment of the Ryndam on the North
Atlantic. It is, moreover, undisputed that the January,
1970, meeting in Salt Lake City, between the League
and top officials of Holland America Line related solely
to discussions of using the Ryndam on the North Atlantic.
In addition to its efforts to escape the reality of its
substantial contacts with this state by arguing that one
or another use of the Ryndam changes the basic character of the parties' 1969 and 1970 negotiations, the defendant has attempted to minmize the impact of its negotiations here by characterizing them as "isolated" contacts having no bearing on the jurisdictional issue.
(HAL Brief at 17.) But these two negotiating sessions
were not "one-shot" contacts between strangers. On the
contrary, these negotiations followed a highly profitable
business relationship of several years' duration. The
Utah meetings were, moreover, preceded by a series of
telephonic, letter and telegraphic communications with
the plaintiff in Utah regarding the use of the Ryndam
for 1970.
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Consistent with its attempts to negate the existence
of and to minimize the significance of its contacts with
this state, the appellee has attempted to fragment the evidence of its contacts with Utah by treating each such
contact as a separate and independent issue. The appellee, thus, argues at length in its brief that its relationships
with nineteen Utah travel agents holding sub-agency appointments from the Transatlantic Passenger Steamship
Conference are not "business contacts" and are insufficient to warrant the assertion of jurisdiction by the
courts of this state. (HAL Brief at 10-13, 31-39.) The
question, however, is not as the appellee suggests,
whether llolland America Line's agency relationships
with these nineteen Utah travel agents, together with
the nine days spent by HAL sales personnel calling upon
these agents and working with them, are alone sufficient
to warrant the assertion of jurisdiction by our courts. On
the contrary, Holland America Line's agency relationships with these travel agents, its regular calls upon such
agents, its use of these agents to conduct business in
Utah and its generation of substantial revenues from
these agents are simply further evidence of the appellee' s continuous, systematic and regular business contacts with this state. I-Iolland America Line, moreon:r,
markets its passenger and freight services in Utah in
precisely the same manner as it does "everywhere else
in the United States," (Dep. Tuinman at 26-28), and if
the appellee's contacts in Utah are not "business" contacts it has no such contacts anywhere in the United
States.
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In addition to the authorities cited in appellant's
main brief the appellant calls the attention of the court
to the case of Parke-Bernet Galleries, Inc. v. Franklyn,
26 N.Y.2d 13, 256 N.E.2d 506, 308 N.Y.S.2d 337
( 1970). In that case, the defendant California citizen
requested and received a catalogue from defendant, a
New York auctioneer. On the day of the auction plaintiff's employee relayed defendant's bids by telephone
from Los Angeles to the auction floor and defendant
successfully bid on two items. A dispute subsequently
arose between the parties concerning the defendant's
telephonic purchase of an auctioned item and the plaintiff New York citizen sought to assert jurisdiction
over the defendant in New York. The defendant had
had absolutely no contact of any kind with the forum
other than his request for the catalogue and his telephoned bid. The New York Court of Appeals upheld
jurisdiction, finding the transaction of business in the
telephone contact. It is, therefore, clear that under
this case and the authorities cited in appellant's main
brief that Holland America Line's regular, continuous,
and systematic business contacts with this state are more
than sufficient to support the assertion of jurisdiction
by the courts of this state.

II.
THIS APPEAL 'iVAS PROPERLY BROUGHT
AS AN APPEAL FROM A FINAL ORDER OR
.JUDGMENT UNDER RULE 72(a) OF THE
UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE.
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This appeal was taken by tiling a notice of appeal
pursuant to the provisions of Rule 72 (a) of the Utah
Rules of Civil Procedure relating to final orders and
judgments. The appellee contends that the lower court's
memorandum decision was not a final order or judgment
within the meaning of Rule 72 (a) of the Utah Rules, but
rather was merely an interlocutory order quashing service of summons and that the appeal, therefore, could only
have been taken by petition to the Supreme Court for an
intermediate appeal under Rule 72 (b).
The appellee, however, relies upon inapplicable authority and ignores the entire purpose and effect of the
lower court's decision. After an evidentiary hearing upon
the defendant's motion to quash service of summons and
to dismiss the complaint for lack of jurisdiction over the
person, the court below ruled upon the sufficiency of
the defendant's activities in this state to permit the assumption of jurisdiction by the courts of Utah. In a ten
page memorandum decision the lower court held that in
light of the fact that plaintiff sought a declaratory judgment that no contract existed between the parties for the
charter by appellant of the SS R yndam for the summer
of 1970, the defendant's activities in this state were insufficient to meet the requirements of due process, either
under the long arm statute, or under the traditional minimum contacts theory. On this basis the court below
granted the defendant's motion to quash service of
process. The court did not expressly rule upon the
defendant's motion to dismiss the complaint for lack of
jurisdiction over the person. In purpose and effect, how-

8

ever, the lower court's judgment is clearly a final determination that the courts of Utah lack jurisdiction over
the person of the defendant.
The appellee's authorities are not in point. Two of
the cases cited by appellee as holding that an order granting a motion to quash service of process is not a final
judgment involved alleged improprieties in the form of
the service. Honerine
Milling Co. v. Tallerday
Steel
Tank Co., 30 Utah 449, 85 P. 626 (1906);
State Tax Comm'n v. Larsen, 110 P.2d 558 (Utah
1941). The third case cited by appellee, Baer v. Young,
479 P.2d 351 (Utah 1971) involves an appeal from an
order granting a motion to set aside a default judgment
and has nothing whatever to do with quashing service
of process. In the case at bar the sufficiency of service
is undisputed. Not one of the cases cited by appellant involved, as does this case, a final determination on the
merits that a defendant foreign corporation's contacts
with this state were insufficient to permit the assertion
of jurisdiction by our courts.
Rule 72 (a), moreover, was expressly amended in
1971 to include appeals from final "orders" as well as
from final "judgments." Utah R. Civ. P. 72 (a). The
lower court's decision in this case is clearly a "final order" determining the issue of jurisdiction over the person of the defendant and the appeal was properly
brought under Rule 72 (a) .
Respectfully submitted,
DANIEL L. BERMAN
Counsel for Appellant
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